๐Ÿ” CVE Alert

CVE-2026-98996

UNKNOWN 0.0

fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts

CVSS Score
0.0
EPSS Score
0.0%
EPSS Percentile
0th

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts The propagate_mount_busy() helper exists to decide whether a synchronous can suceed. It does that by looking at the copies of the victims in the mounts its parent propagates to. One of those functions from propagation hell. It skips a copy that has child mounts except for the case of a single child mount covering the copy's root. That algorithm used to be exact. It isn't anymore. Originally only childless copies were unmounted during propagation. And 1064f874abc0 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") ended up adding covered mounts to both sides in one go. Along came 99b19d16471e ("mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order") and that started to unmount more than before: [1]: A copy of a mount is unmounted when each of its children is either its overmount or a copy of the victim itself. In the former case the overmount gets reparented. In the latter case the copy of the victim will end up being unmounted. So propagate_umount() ended up being rewritten without adjusting propagate_mount_busy(). And currently propagate_mount_busy() doesn't look at copies of the victim that have two or more children nor a single child that is not the overmount. So any such copy in [1] is not checked for references. The result is that a synchronous unmount succeeds, pulling out a mount that is still in use. A container can run into this with its own mounts. The host shares a tree with the container and the host has a mount in that tree: mount -t tmpfs none /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mount -t tmpfs none /mnt/a The container's /mnt is a slave copy of the host mount. The container now takes a detached copy of the tree and mounts that copy beneath its propagated copy of /mnt/a and keeps the file descriptor to the tree open: unshare -m --propagation unchanged mount --make-rslave / fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE) move_mount(fd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt/a", MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 777 775 ... /mnt/a ... master:646 776 777 ... /mnt/a ... master:647 778 777 ... /mnt/a/a ... master:647 The now attached tree (777) is now mounted beneath the container's copy of /mnt/a. That's also where the host mount sits (as seen from the host mount namespace). So the propagated copy (776) of the host's mount is on top of its root and the copy of that (778) is inside it. Now the host runs: umount /mnt/a and it succeeds. The moved tree tree and the copy inside of it are gone from the container. Now only the propagated copy is left and it got reparented to where it was before: grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 776 775 ... /mnt/a ... But the file descriptor still refers to the moved tree. So a synchronous umount detached a mount that is still in use. Teach propagate_mount_busy() the same checks that propagate_umount() does. It now checks for a single victim mount without children for which it can assume that MNT_LOCKED is cleared on every copy like propagate_umount() does. The copies form chains. IOW, when a copy itself receives propagation from the victim's parent then the mount at the same mountpoint inside that copy is a copy as well. Whether a mount receives propagation from the victim's can simply be checked by walking its masters. Walk each chain once from its top so we are sure that nested copies stay linear. Check every reference once of every copy that gets unmounted.

Vendor linux
Product linux
Ecosystems
Industries
Technology
Published Oct 23, 2026
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Affected Versions

Linux / Linux
99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 < bf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 < a210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 < 6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859 dc5ce95b0252d143497283f7f659840d4f8a79d0 fdb8f10499924d96b8eb60cc1354b278f6fcf0e9 bb4fbf094b440a9209ed88c8681960d4b26eec0f b43f81ef0babcc07db1eaaece37c989204e4ff00 81311d1698c0c87c972ba71d3ce44a617b52ea21 4.1.43 < 4.2 4.4.78 < 4.5 4.9.39 < 4.10 4.11.12 < 4.12 4.12.3 < 4.13
Linux / Linux
4.13

References

NVD โ†— CVE.org โ†— EPSS Data โ†—
git.kernel.org: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908 git.kernel.org: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f git.kernel.org: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859