CVE-2026-71272
Memos Webhook DNS Rebinding TOCTOU SSRF in safeDialContext()
Memos' webhook dispatch function safeDialContext() (internal/webhook/webhook.go) resolves the target hostname via net.DefaultResolver.LookupHost() and validates the resulting IPs against reserved ranges, but then dials net.JoinHostPort(host, port) using the original hostname rather than the already-validated IP address. Because net.Dialer.DialContext() performs its own independent DNS resolution, an attacker controlling DNS for the webhook's hostname (e.g. via a short TTL) can return a public, allowed IP during validation and a different, internal IP at dial time — a classic time-of-check/time-of-use DNS-rebinding bypass of the SSRF protection.
| CWE | CWE-367 |
| Vendor | usememos |
| Product | memos |
| Published | Aug 5, 2026 |
| Last Updated | Aug 5, 2026 |
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CVSS v3 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N