CVE-2026-67543
Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
| CWE | CWE-94 CWE-269 |
| Vendor | heymrun |
| Product | heym |
| Published | Nov 11, 2026 |
Get instant alerts for heymrun heym
Be the first to know when new high vulnerabilities affecting heymrun heym are published — delivered to Slack, Telegram or Discord.
CVSS v3 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H