CVE-2026-52940

tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user() tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage. An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet. Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.

Affected Versions

References