CVE-2026-44430
MCP Registry: Unauthenticated SSRF: HTTP namespace verification dials 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local IPv6 addresses, bypassing private-address allowlist
The MCP Registry provides MCP clients with a list of MCP servers, like an app store for MCP servers. Prior to 1.7.7, the Registry's HTTP-based namespace verification (POST /v0/auth/http, POST /v0.1/auth/http) uses safeDialContext (internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/http.go:67-110) to refuse dialling private/internal addresses when fetching the well-known public-key file from a publisher-supplied domain. The blocklist (isBlockedIP, lines 125-133) relies entirely on Go stdlib's IsLoopback / IsPrivate / IsLinkLocalUnicast / IsMulticast / IsUnspecified plus a manual CGNAT range. None of these cover IPv6 6to4 (2002::/16), NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48 per RFC 8215), or deprecated site-local (fec0::/10) — all of which encode arbitrary IPv4 in the address bits and tunnel to RFC1918 / cloud-metadata services on dual-stack / NAT64-enabled hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.7.
| CWE | CWE-918 |
| Vendor | modelcontextprotocol |
| Product | registry |
| Published | May 14, 2026 |
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